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Toward Strategic Solvency

The Crisis of American Military Primacy
and the Search for Strategic Solvency
Hal Brands and Eric Edelman
© 2017 Hal Brands and Eric Edelman

ABSTRACT: The authors discuss the erosion of US military
primacy and the corresponding dangers for American grand
strategy and international security. They analyze three options for
restoring strategic solvency and recommend a significant expansion
of US defense resources to bring capabilities back into alignment
with US global commitments.

A

merica is hurtling toward strategic insolvency.1 For two
decades after the Cold War, Washington enjoyed essentially
uncontested military dominance and a historically favorable
global environment—all at a comparatively low military and financial
price. Now, however, America confronts military and geopolitical challenges more numerous and severe than at any time in at least a quarter
century—precisely as disinvestment in defense has left US military
resources far scarcer than before. The result is a creeping crisis of American
military primacy, as Washington’s margin of superiority is diminished, and
the gap between US commitments and capabilities grows. “Superpowers
don’t bluff,” went a common Obama-era refrain—but today, America
is being left with a strategy of bluff as its preeminence wanes and its
military means come out of alignment with its geopolitical ends.
Foreign policy, Walter Lippmann wrote, entails “bringing into
balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s
commitments and the nation’s power.” If a statesman fails to preserve
strategic solvency, if he fails to “bring his ends and means into balance,”
Lippmann added, “he will follow a course that leads to disaster.”2
America’s current state of strategic insolvency is indeed fraught with
peril. It will undermine US alliances by raising doubts about the credibility of American guarantees. It will weaken deterrence by tempting
adversaries to think aggression may be successful or go unopposed.
Should conflict actually erupt in key areas, the United States may be
unable to uphold existing commitments or only be able to do so at
prohibitive cost. Finally, as the shadows cast by US military power
grow shorter, American diplomacy is likely to become less availing,
and the global system less responsive, to US influence. The US military
remains far superior to any single competitor, but its power is becoming
dangerously insufficient for the grand strategy and international order
it supports.

1     This article is derived from a longer report: Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, Avoiding a Strategy
of Bluff: The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], forthcoming, 2017).
2     Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), 9–10.
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Great powers facing strategic insolvency have three basic options.
First, they can decrease commitments thereby restoring equilibrium
with diminished resources. Second, they can live with greater risk by
gambling that their enemies will not test vulnerable commitments
or by employing riskier approaches—such as nuclear escalation—to
sustain commitments on the cheap. Third, they can expand capabilities,
thereby restoring strategic solvency. Today, this approach would probably require a concerted, long-term defense buildup comparable to the
efforts of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan near the end of
the Cold War.3
Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—
reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous
and perhaps impossible.4 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem.
Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best
option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into
strategic bankruptcy which will eventually be punished.

I

Since the Cold War, America has been committed to maintaining
overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared,
that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has been
featured in every major US strategy document and reflected in concrete terms.5 Since the early 1990s, for example, the United States has
accounted for 35–45 percent of world defense spending and maintained
peerless global power-projection capabilities.6 Perhaps more important,
US primacy was unrivaled in key strategic regions such as Europe, East
Asia, and the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s millionman Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm (1991) to deploying
two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the third Taiwan Strait crisis
(1995–96) with impunity, Washington has been able to project military
power superior to anything a regional rival could employ, even on its
own geopolitical doorstep.
This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone
of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, US policymakers
committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier
eras and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They
committed to fostering a global environment in which liberal values
and an open international economy could flourish and in which
international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and
catastrophic terrorism would be suppressed. And because they saw

3     In practice, these options are not mutually exclusive—one could conceivably pursue a
hybrid approach. But here, we treat these options as distinct to better flesh out their respective risks
and merits.
4     Michael J. Mazarr, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4
(Fall 2012): 7–22, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2012.725020.
5     George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West
Point, New York,” June 1, 2002; and Eric S. Edelman, “The Strange Career of the 1992 Defense
Planning Guidance,” in In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11, ed.
Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 63–77.
6     Military spending statistics are drawn from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
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military force as the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of
military preponderance.
Washington would need the military power to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments and preserve substantial overmatch versus
any potential great-power rival. The United States must be able to answer
the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism today. Finally, because
prevailing global norms reflect hard-power realities, America would
need superiority to assure its own values remain ascendant. Saying US
strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge” was impolitic, but it was not inaccurate.7
American primacy, moreover, has been eminently affordable. At the
height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) on defense; since the mid-1990s, the number
has usually been 3–4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international
environment, Washington has enjoyed primacy—and its geopolitical
fruits—on the cheap.
Until recently, US strategy also heeded the limits of how cheaply
primacy could be had. The American military shrank significantly
during the 1990s, but US officials understood that if Washington cut
back too far, US primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to
deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility, stability
of key regions would be eroded, rivals would be emboldened, and international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a
reasonably priced insurance policy, requiring nontrivial expenditures—
and protecting against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid the
premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently
American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

II

For most of the post-Cold War era, the international system was—
by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse,
the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power
competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and
East Asia, and the comparative weakness of “rogue” actors—Iran,
Iraq, North Korea, and al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged
American power. Now, however, the strategic landscape is darkening
due to four factors.
First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two
leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional
7     On post-Cold War grand strategy, see Hal Brands, “The Pretty Successful Superpower,”
American Interest 12, no. 3 (January/February 2017): 6–17; and Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar
Moment: US Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2016).
8     John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National
Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 393; and “Military
Expenditure (percent of GDP),” World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL
.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US&page=3. /databases/milex.
9     William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997 (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense [DoD], 1997).
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hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom
of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite
these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic
problems, Russia has conducted major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and
rapid-deployment and special operations forces—and utilized many of
these capabilities in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried
out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays
rising from $26 billion in 1995 to $215 billion in 2015.11 Ominously, these
expenditures have funded power-projection and anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate
US intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to
having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization
efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.
Second, international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s
conventional forces have atrophied, but Pyongyang has amassed a
growing nuclear arsenal and is developing intercontinental delivery
capability.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, which continues
to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing
sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State is
headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented
for any terrorist group and shown that counterterrorism will continue
to place significant operational demands on US forces. Rogue actors
have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more
capable than at any time in decades.
Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors
to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of
antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities, the proliferation of manportable air defense systems and ballistic missiles, and the increasing
availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex have had
a military-leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities formerly
unique to technologically advanced states. Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems, such as F-15s and F-16s, may
provide decreasing utility against even nongreat-power competitors,
and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate
American overmatch.
Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the
1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist
extremism but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts
in the Middle East, but East Asia and Europe were comparatively
secure. Now, old threats still exist, but the more permissive conditions
have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist
organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges
in all three Eurasian theaters. The United States thus faces not just more
10     International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: IISS,
2015), 159–67; and Catrin Einhorn, Hannah Fairfield, and Tim Wallace, “Russia Rearms for a New
Era,” New York Times, December 24, 2015.
11     SIPRI database.
12     Barbara Staff and Ryan Browne, “Intel Officials: North Korea ‘Probably’ Has Miniaturized
Nuke,” CNN News, March 25, 2016; and David Albright, Future Directions in the DPRK’s
Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures Series
(Washington, DC: US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015).
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significant but also more numerous challenges to its military dominance
than it has for at least a quarter century.

III

One might expect the leader of a historically favorable international
system to respond to such developments by increasing its relatively
modest investments in maintaining the system. In recent years, however,
Washington has markedly disinvested in defense. Constant-dollar
defense spending fell by nearly one-fourth, from $768 billion in 2010
to $595 billion in 2015.13 Defense spending as a share of GDP fell from
4.7 percent to 3.3 percent, with Congressional Budget Office projections
showing military outlays falling to 2.6 percent by 2024—the lowest level
since before World War II.14
Defense spending always declines after major wars, of course. Yet
from 2010 onward, this pressure was compounded by the legacy of
Bush-era budget deficits, the impact of the Great Recession (2007–9),
and President Obama’s decision to transfer resources from national
security to domestic priorities. These forces, in turn, were exacerbated
by the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the sequester
mechanism. Defense absorbed roughly 50 percent of these spending
cuts, despite accounting for less than 20 percent of federal spending. By
walling off most personnel costs and severely limiting flexibility in how
cuts could be made, moreover, the sequester caused the Department of
Defense to make reductions in blunt, nonstrategic fashion.15
This budgetary buzz saw has taken a toll. Readiness has
suffered alarmingly with all services struggling to conduct current
counterterrorism operations while also preparing for the evergrowing danger of great-power war. “The services are very good at
counterinsurgency,” the House Armed Services Committee noted in
2016, “but they are not prepared to endure a long fight against higher
order threats from near-peer competitors.”16 Modernization has
also been compromised; the ability to develop and field promising
future capabilities has been sharply constrained by budget caps and
uncertainty. This problem will only get worse—in the 2020s, a “bow
wave” of deferred investments in the nuclear triad and high-end
conventional capabilities will come due.17
Finally, force structure has been sacrificed. The Army has fared
worst—it is slated to decline to 450,000 personnel by 2018, or 30,000
personnel fewer than prior to 9/11.18 But all the services are at or near
post-World War II lows in end strength, and the US military is significantly smaller than the 1990s-era “base force,” which was designed as
13     SIPRI database.
14     “Military Expenditure,” World Bank; and Loren Thompson, “Pentagon Budget Headed
Below 3% of GDP as Warfighting Edge Wanes,” Forbes, February 2, 2015.
15     Robert Zarate, “FPI Analysis: Obama’s FY2014 Defense Budget & The Sequestration
Standoff,” Foreign Policy Initiative, April 11, 2013; and Todd Harrison, Analysis of the FY 2013
Defense Budget and Sequestration (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2012).
16     Quoted in Dave Majumdar, “The Pentagon’s Readiness Crisis: Why the 2017 Defense Bill
Will Make Things Worse,” Buzz (blog), National Interest, July 13, 2016.
17     Todd Harrison and Evan Braden Montgomery, The Cost of U.S. Nuclear Forces: From BCA
to Bow Wave and Beyond (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2015).
18      Jim Tice, “Army Shrinks to Smallest Level Since Before World War II,” Army Times,
May 7, 2016; and Tony Capaccio and Gopal Ratnam, “Hagel Seeks Smallest U.S. Army Since before
2001 Attack,” Bloomberg, February 24, 2014.
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the “minimum force . . . below which the nation should not go if it was
to remain a globally engaged superpower.”19 “Strategy wears a dollar
sign,” Bernard Brodie wrote, and Washington is paying for less capability
relative to the threats it faces than at any time in decades.20

IV

Cumulatively, these developments have resulted in a creeping crisis
of US military primacy. Washington still possesses vastly more military
power than any challenger, particularly in global power-projection capabilities. Yet even this global primacy is declining. The United States faces
a Russia with significant extraregional power-projection capabilities as
well as near-peer capabilities in areas such as strategic nuclear forces and
cyberwarfare. China’s military budget is now more than one-third of the
US budget, and Beijing is developing its own advanced power-projection
capabilities.21 Perhaps more importantly, US global primacy is also
increasingly irrelevant, because today’s crucial geopolitical competitions
are regional contests, and here the trends have been decidedly adverse.
In East Asia, China’s two-decade military buildup has allowed
Beijing to contest seriously US power projection within the first island
chain. “The balance of power between the United States and China
may be approaching a series of tipping points,” RAND Corporation
analysts observe.22 The situation in Eastern Europe is worse. Here, unfavorable geography and aggressive Russian modernization have created
significant Russian overmatch in the Baltic; US and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are “outnumbered and outgunned”
along NATO’s eastern flank.23 In the Middle East, the balance remains
more favorable, but Iranian A2/AD and ballistic missile capabilities
could significantly complicate US operations, while the reemergence of
Russian military power has narrowed US freedom of action. In key areas
across Eurasia, the US military edge has eroded.
This erosion, in turn, has profound implications for American
strategy. For one thing, US forces will face far harder fights should
conflict occur. War against Iran or North Korea would be daunting
enough, given their asymmetrical capabilities. Even Iran, for instance,
could use its ballistic missile capabilities to attack US bases and allies,
employ swarming tactics and precision-guided munitions against US
naval forces in the Persian Gulf, and activate Shīʿite militias and proxy
forces, all as a way of inflicting higher costs on the United States.24
Conflict against Russia or China would be something else entirely.
Fighting a near-peer competitor armed with high-end conventional
weapons and precision-strike capabilities would subject the US military
to an environment of enormous lethality, “the likes of which,” Army
Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley has commented, it “has not
19     Mark Gunzinger, Shaping America’s Future Military: Toward a New Force Planning Construct
(Washington, DC: CSBA, 2013), 2–3.
20     Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1959), 358.
21     On Chinese spending, see SIPRI database.
22     Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving
Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 342.
23     Ibid.
24     Mark Gunzinger, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial
Threats with Chris Dougherty (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2011), 21–52.
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experienced . . . since World War II.”25 American forces might still
win—albeit on a longer time line and at a painfully high cost in lives—
but they might not.
According to open-source analysis, US and forces would have
little chance of halting a determined Russian assault on the Baltic
states. Facing severe disadvantages in tanks, ground-based fires, and
airpower and air defenses, those forces would likely be destroyed in place.
NATO would then face an agonizing dilemma—whether to mobilize
its resources for a protracted war that would risk nuclear escalation, or
acquiesce to an alliance-destroying fait accompli.26
Similarly, whereas the United States would have dominated any plausible conflict with China in the 1990s, according to recent assessments
the most likely conflicts would be nearer run things today. Consider a
conflict over Taiwan. Beijing might not be able to defeat Washington in
a long war, but it could establish air and maritime superiority early in
a conflict and thereby impose unacceptable losses on US air and naval
forces. The crucial tipping point in a Taiwan contingency could come as
early as 2020 or even 2017; in the Spratly Islands, it could come within
another decade.27 As US superiority erodes, America runs a higher risk
of being unable to meet its obligations.
In fact, Washington’s ability to execute its standing global defense
strategy is increasingly doubtful. After the Cold War, the United States
adopted a two major regional contingency standard geared toward
preventing an adversary in one region from undertaking opportunistic
aggression to exploit US preoccupation in another. By 2012, budget cuts
had already forced the Obama administration to shift to a 1.5 or 1.7
war standard premised on decisively defeating one opponent while
“imposing unacceptable costs” on another.28 Yet the US capacity to
execute even this less ambitious strategy is under strain, just as the
international environment raises questions about whether the strategy
is ambitious enough.
This doubt has arisen because the Obama administration’s 2012
defense strategy was announced prior to sequestration, and prior to
Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014—which raised the disturbing
possibility that one of America’s wars might be against a nuclear-armed,
great-power competitor. And beyond these issues, events in Europe
and the Middle East since 2012 have raised doubts about whether a
1.7 war standard is sufficient given the possibility the Pentagon might
confront conflicts in three strategic theaters—against Russia in Europe,
Iran or an Islamic State-like actor in the Middle East, and China or
North Korea in East Asia—on overlapping time frames. In sum, the
United States is rapidly reaching, if it has not already reached, the point
of strategic insolvency. And even beyond the aforementioned risks, this
situation poses fundamental strategic challenges.
25     Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army $40B Short on Modernization Vs. Russia, China: CSA Milley,”
Breaking Defense, October 3, 2016.
26     David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
27     Heginbotham et al., U.S.-China Military Scorecard, xxx, 338, 342.
28     DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: DoD,
2012), 4.
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The cohesion of US alliances will likely suffer, as American allies
lose confidence in Washington’s ability to protect them. Adversaries,
in turn, will become more likely to test US commitments, to gauge
Washington’s willingness to make good on increasingly tenuous
promises, and to exploit its declining ability to respond decisively. Russian
intimidation of the Baltic states, Iranian expansionism in the Middle
East, and increasingly aggressive Chinese coercion of the Philippines
and Japan illustrate these dynamics in action.
Finally, as US military power becomes less imposing, the United
States will find its global influence less impressive. Norms, ideas, and
international arrangements supported by Washington will lose strength
and increasingly be challenged by actors empowered to imprint their
own influence on global affairs. American grand strategy and the
post-Cold War system have rested on American military overmatch; as
that overmatch fades, US grand strategy and the order it supports will
come under tremendous strain.

V

So how should America respond? One option is reducing
commitments. If the United States cannot sustain its existing global
strategy, then it could pare back global obligations until they are more
commensurate with available capabilities.
The United States might, for instance, embrace a twenty-first
century Nixon Doctrine, by stating that it will protect Middle Eastern
partners from conventional, state-based aggression, but that they must
defend themselves against nontraditional threats such as the Islamic
State.29 Or, America could simply delegate Persian Gulf security to its
Arab allies in the region. Most dramatically, if the United States were
really serious about slashing commitments, it could dispense with the
obligations most difficult to uphold—to Taiwan and the Baltic states,
for instance. In short, America would reduce commitments proactively,
rather than having their hollowness exposed by war.
There are historical precedents for this approach. The Nixon
Doctrine and US withdrawal from Vietnam helped Washington retreat
to a more defensible strategic perimeter in the 1970s following strategic
overstretch in the decade prior. More significantly, beginning in the
late-nineteenth century, the United Kingdom gradually conducted an
elegant global retreat by first relying upon rising regional powers such
as the United States and Japan to maintain acceptable regional orders,
and later encouraging Washington to shoulder many of London’s
global burdens after World War II. Graceful retrenchment, then, is not
an impossibility.30
It is, however, extremely problematic today. This approach—
particularly the more aggressive variants—would be enormously
difficult to implement. The US commitment to the Baltic states is part
of a larger commitment to NATO; shredding the former guarantee
29     Under the Nixon Doctrine, Washington would keep existing treaty commitments in Asia and
defend allies against aggression by a nuclear power, but it would provide only military and economic
assistance to allies and partners facing other threats, namely insurgencies.
30     See, generally, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising
Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 7–44.
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risks undermining the broader alliance. Even in Asia, where the United
States has bilateral alliances, withdrawing the US commitment to Taipei
could cause leaders in Manila, Seoul, or Tokyo to wonder if they might
be abandoned next—and to hedge their strategic bets accordingly.
Alliances hinge on the credibility of the patron’s promises; revoking
some guarantees without discrediting others is difficult.31
This dynamic underscores another liability—the likelihood of
profound geopolitical instability. Retrenchment works best when the
overstretched hegemon can hand off excessive responsibilities to some
friendly power. But today, there is no liberal superpower waiting in the
wings. Rather, the countries most sympathetic to America’s view of the
international order—Japan, the United Kingdom, and key European
allies—confront graver long-term economic and demographic
challenges than the United States. The countries most likely to gain
influence following US retrenchment—Russia and China—have very
different global visions.
In these circumstances, US retrenchment seems unlikely to succeed.
Rather than simply forcing friendly local actors to do more to defend
themselves and check revisionist powers, the outcome might easily
be underbalancing—in which collective action problems, internal
political divisions, or resource limitations prevent timely action against
a potential aggressor—or bandwagoning, in which exposed countries
buy a measure of safety by aligning with, rather than against, an aggressive power.32 Meanwhile, although writing off Taiwan or Estonia might
produce a near-term improvement of relations with Beijing or Moscow,
the longer-term effect would be to remove a chief constraint on the
aggressive behavior these powers have been increasingly manifesting.
If Moscow and Beijing seem eager to bring their “near abroads” to heel
now, just wait until the United States retracts its security perimeter.33
If more aggressive variants of retrenchment are thus deeply flawed,
even more limited versions, such as a Middle Eastern Nixon Doctrine,
have weaknesses. As Iran’s military power continues to grow, and the
recent removal of nuclear-related sanctions makes this seem likely, even
the wealthy Persian Gulf kingdoms will have great difficulty dealing
with Tehran’s advanced and asymmetric capabilities without US assistance. In fact, without US leadership, the long-standing collection action
problems between the Gulf countries are likely to worsen. Moreover, the
United States essentially tried a version of this approach by withdrawing
from Iraq in late 2011. But as soon became clear, Iraq, a vital state in
a key region, could not withstand challenges from nontraditional foes
such as the Islamic State on its own. In fact, US retrenchment actually
encouraged developments that left Iraq more vulnerable to collapse,
such as the increasingly sectarian nature of Nūrī al-Mālikī’s governance
31     On credibility and reputation, see Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation:
How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (Spring 2015):
473–95, doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393.
32     On these phenomena, see Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on
the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Randall L. Schweller,
“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1
(Summer 1994): 72–107, doi:10.2307/2539149.
33     Hal Brands, The Limits of Offshore Balancing (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2015), 49–52.
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and the hollowing out of the Iraqi Security Forces.34 Retrenchment,
then, may narrow the gap between capabilities and commitments in the
short run, but only by inviting greater global dangers and instability.

VI

If the United States is unwilling to spend significantly more on
defense, but does not wish to invite the geopolitical instability associated
with retrenchment, a second option is to live with greater risk. Living
with greater risk could take two different, but not mutually exclusive,
forms. First, the United States could accept higher risk with respect to
its global commitments by wagering that even exposed commitments
are unlikely to be tested because US adversaries are risk averse and are
unwilling to start a war, even a potentially successful one, that might
cause American intervention. In other words, the United States might
not be able to defend Taiwan effectively, but the mere prospect of an
invasion provoking a Sino-American war would stay Beijing’s hand.
Second, the United States could bridge the capabilitiescommitments gap through riskier strategies substituting escalation for
additional resources. Most likely, this would entail relying more heavily
on nuclear warfighting and the threat of nuclear retaliation to defend
vulnerable allies in East Asia or Eastern Europe. Because US allies are
already covered by the US extended nuclear deterrent, this approach
would involve making more explicit nuclear threats and guarantees and
integrating greater reliance on nuclear weapons into US plans. Similarly,
this approach could entail the use, or the threat of use, of powerful
nonnuclear capabilities such as strategic cyberattacks against critical
enemy infrastructure for the same purpose—bolstering deterrence on
the cheap by raising the costs an aggressor would expect to pay.35
Lest these approaches sound ridiculous, both have a distinguished
pedigree. In the late 1940s, the United States could not credibly defend
Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. But the Truman administration
still undertook the security guarantees associated with NATO on the
calculated gamble that Moscow was unlikely to risk global war by
attacking US allies, particularly during the period of the US nuclear
monopoly.36 And in the 1950s, to control costs and address the
continuing deficiency of US and allied conventional forces, the
Eisenhower administration relied heavily on nuclear threats to deter
aggression.37 Throughout much of the Cold War, in fact, the United
States compensated for conventional inferiority—particularly in Central
Europe—by integrating early recourse to nuclear weapons into its
war plans. Accepting greater risk would mean updating Cold War-era
approaches for today’s purposes.
34     Rick Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 6 (November/December 2014): 25–34; and Dexter Filkins, “What We Left Behind,” New Yorker,
April 28, 2014.
35     To clarify, this would entail more than simply using cyber as part of a US conventional
defense of Taiwan or the Baltic. Rather, it would entail using strategic cyberattacks against strategic
targets—economic, military, or infrastructure—not directly associated with the aggression.
36     Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 87–90.
37     H. W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,”
American Historical Review 94, no. 4 (October 1989): 963–89, doi:10.2307/1906591.
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Yet substituting risk for cost entails serious liabilities. Simply hoping
exposed commitments will not be challenged might work—for a while.
But this strategy carries enormous risk of those guarantees eventually
being tested and found wanting, with devastating effects on America’s
reputation and credibility. Meanwhile, a strategy of bluff could weaken
deterrence and reassurance on the installment plan as allies and
adversaries perceive a shifting balance of power and understand US
guarantees are increasingly chimerical.
The second variant of this approach, embracing more escalatory
approaches, lacks credibility. Consider threatening to employ strategic
cyberattacks against an aggressor in a conflict over Taiwan or the
Baltic states. Such threats are problematic, because as President Obama
acknowledged in 2016, “open societies” such as the United States are
“more vulnerable” to massive cyberattacks than authoritarian rivals such
as Russia or China.38 America may simply lack the escalation dominance
needed to make a strategy of cyber-retaliation believable.
So too in the nuclear realm. Threats to punish Communist aggression with nuclear retaliation might have been credible in the 1950s,
when China lacked nuclear weapons: Washington had a massive nuclear
advantage over Moscow, and neither adversary could reliably target
the US homeland. But today, both rivals possess secure second-strike
capabilities and could inflict horrific damage on America should nuclear
escalation occur. This approach thus risks leading the United States into
a trap where, if its interests are challenged, it faces a choice between
pursuing escalatory options carrying potentially unacceptable costs and
acquiescing to aggression. Awareness of this dynamic may, in turn, make
adversaries more likely to probe and push. Trading cost for risk may
seem attractive in theory, but in practice the risks may prove far more
dangerous than they initially seem.

VII

This leaves a final option—significantly increasing resources
devoted to defense, thereby bringing capabilities back into alignment
with commitments and strengthening the hard-power backbone of US
strategy. Given current trends, this strategy would likely entail a
sustained, multiyear buildup of magnitude roughly similar to the
Carter-Reagan buildup, when real defense spending increased by
around 50 percent. This buildup would require permanently lifting the
Budget Control Act caps to provide increased resources and budgetary
stability. It would require not just procuring larger quantities of existing
capabilities but also investing aggressively in future capabilities geared
toward defeating great-power challengers as well as middle-tier problem
countries such as Iran and North Korea. And crucially, greater resources
would have to be coupled with developing innovative operational
concepts, streamlining Defense procedures and acquisition processes,
and maximizing the Pentagon’s other efforts toward effectiveness
and efficiency.
Recent proposals demonstrate the likely parameters of this
approach. If the goal was to restore an authentic two major regional
38     Ron Synovitz, “Europe Bracing against Risk of Russian ‘Influence Operations,’ ” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 16, 2017.
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contingency capability, the United States might follow the recommendations issued in 2014 by the National Defense Panel, which call for a force
consisting, at minimum, of 490,000 active duty Army personnel and
182,000 marines, a Navy of between 323 and 346 ships (versus 274
today), and an Air Force of unspecified size but substantially larger
than the end-strength envisioned in late Obama-era budgets.39 If, more
ambitiously, the United States sought a two-plus or even a three-war
standard, a more significant buildup would be required.
One recent estimate issued by Senator John McCain calls for a threetheater force—a Navy of over 330 ships and nearly 900 frontline naval
strike fighters, an Air Force of 60 combat squadrons and 1,500 combat
aircraft, an Army of at least 490,000–500,000 active duty soldiers, and a
Marine Corps of at least 200,000 active duty marines. Because McCain’s
budget reaches out only 5 years, these numbers would presumably
grow further over time.40 Another three-theater proposal by the
American Enterprise Institute advocates a 10-year expansion to 600,000
active duty Army soldiers, over 200,000 active duty marines, a Navy of
346 ships, and an Air Force of unspecified but significantly increased
end-strength. The number of F-22s, for instance, would rise from 185
to 450.41
These proposals would require significant new investments. The
McCain budget calls for $430 billion in new money over 5 years, culminating in a Fiscal Year 2022 budget of roughly $800 billion.42 The
American Enterprise Institute proposal, issued in late 2015, calls for
$1.3 trillion in new money over 10 years.43 All of these force constructs
reflect a high-low mix designed to enable effective operations ranging
from counterterrorism, to major conventional war against Iran or North
Korea, to high-end combat against a great-power adversary. All the
proposals include robust recapitalization of the US nuclear triad. And
although these proposals differ on specifics, all are meant to enable a
range of investments necessary to maintaining US primacy in a more
competitive environment.
If the United States were to undertake a buildup of this magnitude,
it could, for instance, invest in a more survivable, multibrigade presence
in Eastern Europe. America could significantly increase investments
in capabilities—from additional Zumwalt-class destroyers and nuclear
attack submarines, to stealthy fighters and penetrating long-range
bombers, to vastly enhanced stocks of precision-guided and standoff
munitions, to improved air and missile defenses necessary to retain air
and sea control in high-end conflicts as well as to maintain the upper

39     National Defense Panel, Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense
Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace, 2014).
40     Senator John McCain, Restoring American Power: Recommendations for the FY 2018–FY 2022
Defense Budget (Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee, 2017), 9–14.
41     Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, To Rebuild America’s Military (Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 2015), 25.
42     McCain, Restoring American Power, 20.
43     Thomas Donnelly, “Great Powers Don’t Pivot,” in How Much is Enough? Alternative Defense
Strategies, ed. Jacob Cohn, Ryan Boone, and Thomas Mahnken (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2016), 7;
also Ware Center, To Rebuild America’s Military, 70.
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hand in fights with Iran and North Korea.44 This approach would ease
the tradeoffs between critical capabilities for today’s fight, such as the
A-10, and those critical for tomorrow’s fight, such as the F-35. Crucially,
this approach would also allow aggressive development and production
of future technologies in areas from hypersonics to directed energy,
which currently receive seed funding but cannot be adequately fielded
without additional resources.45 Finally, this approach, particularly the
more aggressive, three-theater option, would permit the increased force
structure necessary to cover a larger number of contingencies and reduce
stress on the current force.
So how viable is this option? Critics offer four primary objections.
The first critique deems this approach unnecessary, because the Pentagon
can maintain US primacy at existing budget levels either by pursuing
technological innovation and strategic offsets or by undertaking business and acquisition reforms. The second critique asserts a sustained,
multiyear buildup will overtax the US economy, given persistent budget
deficits and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 76 percent.46 The third critique
views this approach as self-defeating because it will spur arms races
with American adversaries. The fourth critique holds this approach will
incentivize continued free-riding by US allies and partners by forcing
Washington to continue subsidizing their defense. All of these arguments have some logic, but none is persuasive.
The first argument—about innovation, offsets, and defense
reform—is alluring but unsatisfying. To be sure, repurposing existing
capabilities, developing high-end future capabilities to create significant
dilemmas for competitors from Iran to China, and designing innovative
operational concepts—essentially, what former Secretaries of Defense
Hagel and Ashton Carter termed the Third Offset Strategy—are absolutely vital to restoring strategic solvency. Yet offsets and innovation
cannot by themselves compensate for the lack of resources Washington
faces in covering the range of plausible contingencies.
Moreover, any meaningful offset strategy is dependent on significantly greater resources. As senior Pentagon officials have acknowledged,
right now the United States simply cannot field even promising technologies in numbers sufficient to have strategic impact. “We’ll do the demo,
we’ll be very happy with the results, [but] we won’t have the money to
go on,” Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall warned in 2016.47
Offsets and innovation are necessary for sustaining American primacy,
but they are hardly sufficient. Similarly, although virtually all experts
consider defense reform essential, no one has identified a feasible reform
program sufficient to close the capabilities-commitments gap.
The economic argument is also deceptive. Although a multiyear
buildup would be very expensive, it would hardly be unmanageable. Even
44     On the importance of these various capabilities, see Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested
Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International
Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 140–43, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00160; Timothy A. Walton, “Securing
the Third Offset Strategy: Priorities for the Next Secretary of Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd
Quarter 2016): 6–15; and Gunzinger, Outside-In.
45     Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Pentagon Can’t Afford to Field 3rd Offset Tech under BCA: Frank
Kendall,” Breaking Defense, October 31, 2016.
46     On debt-to-GDP ratio, see Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Budget and Economic
Outlook: 2016 to 2026 (Washington, DC: CBO, 2016), 3.
47     Freedberg, “Pentagon.”
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the most aggressive proposed buildups would push defense spending
only to 4 percent of GDP. The United States has previously supported
far higher relative defense burdens without compromising economic
performance.48 One cannot draw a perfect parallel with earlier eras, of
course, because during the 1950s America enjoyed higher growth and
lower levels of deficits and debt. But these factors do not make a major
buildup economically impossible.
For one thing, defense spending increases can actually stimulate
growth. As Martin Feldstein, a former chair of the Council of Economic
Advisers, has noted, “Military procurement has the . . . advantage that
almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in
the United States, creating demand and jobs here at home.”49 Moreover,
defense spending simply does not drive federal spending or deficits
to the extent often imagined. In fiscal year 2016, defense consumed
16 percent of federal spending; domestic entitlements consumed 49
percent.50 As a result, the growth of federal debt is influenced far more
by unconstrained entitlement spending and insufficient tax revenues
than by defense outlays. Put differently, if Washington can make politically difficult decisions regarding tax increases and curbing entitlement
growth, it can spend significantly more on defense while also getting
its fiscal house in order. If, conversely, the United States is unwilling to
confront such politically difficult decisions, then the deficit will explode,
the debt-to-GDP ratio will skyrocket, and Social Security and Medicare/
Medicaid will go bankrupt regardless of how much or how little the
country spends on defense.
The third objection, regarding intensified competition with US
rivals, is also problematic. It is hard to see how increased US defense
spending could trigger an arms race with Russia or China, or Iran
or North Korea, because these countries are already developing significant military capabilities aimed at the United States. China, for
instance, has averaged double-digit annual defense spending increases
for two decades. Strenuous military competition is already underway;
US adversaries are just the ones competing most seriously. Moreover,
although increased US defense efforts, particularly if paired with
additional forward presence in Eastern Europe or East Asia, might
cause increased near-term tensions with Moscow or Beijing, over the
longer-term, failure to counter Russian and Chinese buildups and
limit their opportunities for successful coercion might well prove
more destabilizing.
To be sure, Russia and China, or even Iran and North Korea, are
not powerless to respond to US capability enhancement, and there may
come a time when Washington simply cannot preserve the desired level
of overmatch at an acceptable cost. Yet in light of the significant internal
challenges—political, economic, demographic, or all of the above—
facing each of America’s adversaries, the passing of US primacy is hardly
48     Ware Center, To Rebuild America’s Military, 2.
49     Martin Feldstein, “Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus,” Wall Street Journal, December
24, 2008.
50     “Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, March 4, 2016, http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basics
-where-do-our-federal-tax-dollars-go.
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inevitable.51 Given how advantageous US primacy has proven over the
decades, America’s goal should be to push that point of unsustainability
as far into the future as possible.
The fourth and final objection, regarding allied free riding and the
need for a collective approach, can also be answered. US strategy has
always been a concert strategy, and so this approach certainly requires
enhanced allied efforts. Countries from Japan and Taiwan to Poland and
the Baltic states will have to spend more on defense if their situation is
not to become untenable. They will, in many cases, also have to adopt
more cost-effective and realistic defense strategies.52 But because the
United States cannot simply make this decision for its allies, the question
is which US approach will best encourage constructive changes. And
although advocates of retrenchment often argue allies will only do more
if the United States does less, the United States has been most successful
at securing increased allied contributions when it, too, has been willing
to do more.
In previous instances when NATO allies collectively increased
military spending—during the early 1950s or under the long-term
defense program of the Carter-Reagan years—they did so as part of
a broader program in which Washington also significantly increased
its contributions to European security.53 Likewise, the United States
elicited the best performance from the Iraqi military and government
when the American commitment to Baghdad was greatest, during the
surge of 2007–8. The performance declined rather than improved as
the US commitment was subsequently reduced.54 In sum, the United
States may actually get the most out of its allies and partners when those
countries are reassured of the American commitment and thus prepared
to take risks of their own.
As the principal objections to increasing defense resources fall away,
the advantages and logic become clearer. This approach recognizes,
for instance, how beneficial US military primacy has been in shaping
a relatively stable, prosperous, and congenial international order, and
it makes the investments necessary to sustain as much of this order as
possible. This approach provides the United States with greater ability to
meet aggression from a range of enemies and rivals without resorting to
dangerously escalatory strategies in the most operationally demanding
scenarios. As a result, this approach is arguably best suited to avoid the
use of force over the long term, by averting situations in which American
adversaries from Iran and North Korea to Russia and China think
aggression might pay. “Peace through strength” is not a meaningless
catchphrase; it is good strategy. Closing the capabilities-commitments

51     See, for instance, Robert D. Kaplan, “Eurasia’s Coming Anarchy: The Risks of Chinese and
Russian Weakness,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 2 (March/April 2016).
52     See Jim Thomas, John Stillion, and Iskander Rehman, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deterrence
through Protraction (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2014); and Hal Brands, Dealing with Allies in Decline:
Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shifts (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2017).
53     See Richard L. Kugler, Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990).
54     Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “How to Leave a Stable
Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 40–58; also Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My
Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2013).
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gap by dramatically increasing the former therefore represents the best
available approach.

VIII

“Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and
readily mobilizable, a policy of ‘containment’ . . . is no more than a
policy of bluff.”55 This admonition, written by the authors of NSC-68
in 1950, reflected a dawning realization that insufficient military power
endangered America’s global commitments. The United States faces
another crisis of strategic solvency today as gathering international
threats combine with dwindling military resources to leave the American
superpower in an increasingly overextended and perilous state.
America thus confronts a stark choice about how to proceed.
Of the options considered here, the best approach is to find the resources
necessary to bring American forces back into line with the grand strateg y they are
meant to support. Undertaking a sustained, major military buildup will
not be cheap, but is not unaffordable for a wealthy superpower that
has benefitted so much from military primacy and its geopolitical benefits. Indeed, the fundamental question regarding whether America can
undertake this course is not an economic one. It is whether the country
will politically prioritize the investments needed to sustain its primacy or
allow itself to slip further into strategic insolvency with all the associated
dangers for the United States and global order.
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